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Abstract
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but
not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding
opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish
free-riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish.
This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling
evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out
that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate
equilibrium behavior.
1I. INTRODUCTION
Almost all economic models assume that all people are exclusively pursuing their
material self-interest and do not care about "social" goals per se. This may be true for some (may
be many) people, but it is certainly not true for everybody. By now we have substantial evidence
suggesting that fairness motives affect the behavior of many people. The empirical results of
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler [1986], for example, indicate that customers have strong
feelings about the fairness of firms' short run pricing decisions which may explain why some
firms do not fully exploit their monopoly power.  There is also a lot of evidence suggesting that
firms’ wage setting is constrained by workers’ views about what constitutes a fair wage [Blinder
and Choi 1990; Agell and Lundborg 1995; Bewley 1995; Campbell and Kamlani 1997].
According to these studies a major reason for firms’ refusal to cut wages in a recession is the fear
that workers will perceive pay cuts as unfair which in turn is expected to affect work morale
adversely. There are also many well-controlled bilateral bargaining experiments which indicate
that a nonnegligible fraction of the subjects does not care solely about material payoffs [Güth and
Tietz 1990; Roth 1995; Camerer and Thaler 1995]. However, there is also evidence that seems to
suggest that fairness considerations are rather unimportant. For example, in competitive
experimental markets with complete contracts, in which a well defined homogeneous good is
traded, almost all subjects behave as if they are only interested in their material payoff. Even if
the competitive equilibrium implies an extremely uneven distribution of the gains from trade,
equilibrium is reached within a few periods [Smith and Williams 1990; Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-
Fujiwara, and Zamir 1991; Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992; Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere 1997].
There is similarly conflicting evidence with regard to cooperation. Reality provides many
examples indicating that people are more cooperative than is assumed in the standard self-
interest model. Well known examples are that many people vote, pay their taxes honestly,
participate in unions and protest movements, or work hard in teams even when the pecuniary
incentives go in the opposite direction.1 This is also shown in laboratory experiments [Dawes
and Thaler 1988, Ledyard 1995]. Under some conditions it has even been shown that subjects
achieve nearly full cooperation although the self-interest model predicts complete defection
[Isaac and Walker 1988 and 1991, Ostrom and Walker 1991, Fehr and Gächter 1996].2 However,
as we will see in more detail in Section IV there are also those conditions under which a vast
majority of subjects completely defects as predicted by the self-interest model.
                                                          
1 On voting see Mueller [1989]. Skinner and Slemroad [1985] argue that the standard self interest model
substantially underpredicts the number of honest taxpayers. Successful team production in, e.g., Japanese-managed
auto factories in North America is described in Rehder [1990]. Whyte [1955] discusses how workers establish
"production norms" under piece rate systems.
2 Isaac and Walker and Ostrom and Walker allow for cheap talk while in Fehr and Gächter subjects could punish
each other at some cost.
2There is thus a bewildering variety of evidence. Some pieces of evidence suggest that
many people are driven by fairness considerations, other pieces indicate that virtually all people
behave as if completely selfish and still other types of evidence suggest that cooperation motives
are crucial. In this paper we ask whether this conflicting evidence can be explained by a single
simple model. Our answer to this question is affirmative if one is willing to assume that, in
addition to purely self interested people, there is a fraction of people who is also motivated by
fairness considerations. No other deviations from the standard economic approach are necessary
to account for the evidence. In particular, we do not relax the rationality assumption3.
We model fairness as self-centered inequity aversion. Inequity aversion means that
people resist inequitable outcomes, i. e., they are willing to give up some material payoff to move
in the direction of more equitable outcomes. Inequity aversion is self-centered if people do not
care per se about inequity that exists among other people but are only interested in the fairness of
their own material payoff relative to the payoff of others. We show that in the presence of some
inequity averse people "fair" and "cooperative" as well as "competitive" and "non-cooperative"
behavioral patterns can be explained in a coherent framework. A main insight of our examination
is that the heterogeneity of preferences interacts in important ways with the economic
environment. We show, in particular, that the economic environment determines the preference
type that is decisive for the prevailing behavior in equilibrium. This means, for example, that
under certain competitive conditions a single purely selfish player can induce a large number of
extremely inequity averse players to behave in a completely selfish manner, too. Likewise, under
certain conditions for the provision of a public good, a single selfish player is capable of
inducing all other players to contribute nothing to the public good although the others may care a
lot about equity. We also show, however, that there are circumstances in which the existence of a
few inequity averse players creates incentives for a majority of purely selfish types to contribute
to the public good. Moreover, the existence of inequity averse types may also induce selfish
types to pay wages above the competitive level. This reveals that, in the presence of
heterogeneous preferences, the economic environment has a whole new dimension of effects.4
There are a few other papers that formalize the notion of fairness.5 In particular, Rabin
[1993] argues that people want to be nice to those who treat them fairly and want to punish those
who hurt them. According to Rabin, an action is perceived as fair if the intention that is behind
the action is kind, and as unfair if the intention is hostile. The kindness or the hostility of the
intention, in turn, depends on the equitability of the payoff distribution induced by the action.
                                                          
3 This differentiates our model from learning models [e. g., Roth and Erev 1995] that relax the rationality assumption
but maintain the assumption that all players are only interested in their own material payoff. The issue of learning is
further discussed in Section VII below.
4 Our paper is, therefore, motivated by a similar concern as the papers by Haltiwanger and Waldman [1985] and
Russel and Thaler [1985]. While these authors examine the conditions under which nonrational or quasi-rational
types affect equilibrium outcomes we analyse the conditions under which fair types affect the equilibrium.
5 Section VIII deals with them in more detail.
3Thus Rabin’s model is based, as our model, on the notion of an equitable outcome. In contrast to
our model, however, Rabin models the role of intentions explicitly. We acknowledge that
intentions do play an important role and that it is desirable to model them explicitly. However,
the explicit modeling of intentions comes at a cost because it requires the adoption of
psychological game theory that is much more difficult to apply than standard game theory. In
fact, Rabin’s model is restricted to two-person normal form games which means that very
important classes of games like, e.g., market games and n-person public good games cannot be
analyzed. Since a major focus of this paper is the role of fairness in competitive environments
and the analysis of n-person cooperation games, we chose to not model intentions explicitly. This
has the advantage of keeping the model simple and tractable. We would like to stress, however,
that  - although we do not model intentions explicitly – it is possible to capture intentions
implicitly by our formulation of fairness preferences. We deal with this issue in Section VIII.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present our model of
inequity aversion. Section III applies this model to bilateral bargaining and market games. In
Section IV cooperation games with and without punishments are considered. In Section V we
show that, on the basis of plausible assumptions about preference parameters, the majority of
individual choices in ultimatum and market and cooperation games considered in the previous
sections are consistent with the predictions of our model. Section VI deals with the dictator game
and with gift exchange games. In Section VII we discuss potential extensions and objections to
our model. Section VIII compares our model to alternative approaches in the literature. Section
IX concludes.
II. A SIMPLE MODEL OF INEQUITY AVERSION
An individual is inequity averse if it dislikes outcomes that are perceived as inequitable.
This definition raises, of course, the difficult question how individuals measure or perceive the
fairness of outcomes. Fairness judgments are inevitably based on a kind of neutral reference
outcome. The reference outcome that is used to evaluate a given situation is itself the product of
complicated social comparison processes. In social psychology [Festinger 1954; Stouffer et al.
1949; Homans 1961; Adams 1963] and sociology [Davis 1959; Pollis 1968; Runciman 1966] the
relevance of social comparison processes has been emphasized for a long time. One key insight
of this literature is that relative material payoffs affect people’s well being and behavior. As we
will see below, without the assumption that at least for some people relative payoffs matter it is
difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of the empirical regularities observed in many
experiments. There is, moreover, direct empirical evidence for the importance of relative payoffs.
Agell and Lundborg [1995] and Bewley [1998], for example, show that relative payoff
considerations constitute an important constraint for the internal wage structure of firms. In
4addition, Clark and Oswald [1996] show that comparison incomes have a significant impact on
overall job satisfaction. They construct a comparison income level for a random sample of
roughly 10.000 British individuals by computing a standard earnings equation. This earnings
equation determines the predicted or expected wage of an individual with given socio-economic
characteristics. Then they examine the impact of this comparison wage on overall job
satisfaction. Their main result is that - holding other things constant - the comparison income has
a large and significantly negative impact on overall job satisfaction.
Strong evidence for the importance of relative payoffs is also provided by Loewenstein,
Thompson and Bazerman [1989]. These authors asked subjects to ordinally rank outcomes that
differ in the distribution of payoffs between the subject and a comparison person. On the basis of
these ordinal rankings the authors estimate how relative material payoffs enter the person’s
utility function. The results show that subjects exhibit a strong and robust aversion against
disadvantageous inequality: For a given own income xi subjects rank outcomes in which a
comparison person earns more than xi substantially lower than an outcome with equal material
payoffs. Many subjects also exhibit an aversion against advantageous inequality although this
effect seems to be significantly weaker than the aversion against disadvantageous inequality.
The determination of the relevant reference group and the relevant reference outcome for
a given class of individuals is ultimately an empirical question. The social context, the saliency
of particular agents and the social proximity among individuals are all likely to influence
reference groups and outcomes. Because in the following we restrict attention to individual
behavior in economic experiments we have to make assumptions about reference groups and
outcomes that are likely to prevail in this context. In the laboratory it is usually much simpler to
define what is perceived as an equitable allocation by the subjects. The subjects enter the
laboratory as equals, they don’t know anything about each other, and they are allocated to
different roles in the experiment at random. Thus, it is natural to assume that the reference group
is simply the set of subjects playing against each other and that the reference point, i.e., the
equitable outcome, is given by the egalitarian outcome.
More precisely, we assume the following. First, in addition to purely selfish subjects,
there are subjects who dislike inequitable outcomes. They experience inequity if they are worse
off in material terms than the other players in the experiment and they also feel inequity if they
are better off. Secondly, however, we assume that, in general, subjects suffer more from inequity
that is to their material disadvantage than from inequity that is to their material advantage.
Formally, consider a set of n players indexed by i∈{1,...,n} and let x=(x1,...,xn) denote the vector
of monetary payoffs. The utility function of player i∈{1,...,n} is given by
5(1) Ui(x) = xi - αi
1
n −1
max
j≠ i
∑ {xj - xi,0} -βi 1n − 1 maxj ≠ i∑
{xi - xj,0}  ,
where we assume βi ≤ αi and 0 ≤ βi < 1. In the two-player case (1) simplifies to
(2) Ui(x) = xi - αi max {xj - xi,0} - βi max {xi - xj,0},  i ≠ j.
The second term in (1) or (2) measures the utility loss from disadvantageous inequality,
while the third term measures the loss from advantageous inequality. Figure 1 illustrates the
utility of  player i as a function of xj for a given income xi. Given his own monetary payoff xi,
player i’s utility function obtains a maximum at xj = xi. The utility loss from disadvantageous
inequality (xj > xi) is larger than the utility loss if player i is better off than player j (xj < xi).6
Insert Figure 1 here
To evaluate the implications of this utility function let us start with the two-player case.
For simplicity we assume that the utility function is linear in inequality aversion as well as in xi.
This implies that the marginal rate of substitution between monetary income and inequality is
constant. This may not be fully realistic, but we will show that surprisingly many experimental
observations that seem to contradict each other can be explained on the basis of this very simple
utility function already. However, we will also see that some observations in dictator
experiments suggest that there is a nonnegligible fraction of people who exhibit nonlinear
inequality aversion in the domain of advantageous inequality (see Section VI below).
Furthermore, the assumption αi ≥ βi captures the idea that a player suffers more from
inequality that is to his disadvantage. The above mentioned paper by Loewenstein, Thompson
and Bazerman [1989] provides strong evidence that this assumption is, in general, valid. Note
that αi ≥ βi essentially means that a subject is loss averse in social comparisons: Negative
deviations from the reference outcome count more than positive deviations. There is a large
literature indicating the relevance of loss aversion in other domains [e.g., Tversky and Kahneman
1992]. Hence, it seems natural that loss aversion also affects social comparisons.
We also assume that 0 ≤  βi < 1. βi ≥ 0 means that we rule out the existence of subjects
who like to be better off than others. We impose this assumption here although we believe that
there are subjects with βi < 0.7 The reason is that in the context of the experiments we consider
individuals with βi < 0 have virtually no impact on equilibrium behavior. This is in itself an
                                                          
6 In all experiments  considered in this paper the monetary payoff functions of all subjects were common knowledge.
Note that for inequality aversion to be behaviorally important it is not necessary that subjects are informed about the
final monetary payoffs of the other subjects. As long as subjects’ material payoff functions are common knowledge
they can compute the distributional implications of any (expected) strategy profile, i. e., inequity aversion can affect
their decisions.
7 For the role of status seeking and envy see Frank [1985] and Banerjee [1990].
6interesting insight that will be discussed extensively in Section VII. To interpret the restriction
βi < 1 suppose that player i has a higher monetary payoff than player j. In this case βi = 0.5
implies that player i is just indifferent between keeping 1 Dollar to himself and giving this Dollar
to player j. If βi = 1, then player i is prepared to throw away 1 Dollar in order to reduce his
advantage relative to player j which seems very implausible. This is why we do not consider the
case βi ≥ 1. On the other hand, there is no justification to put an upper bound on αi. To see this
suppose that player i has a lower monetary payoff than player j. In this case player i is prepared to
give up one Dollar of his own monetary payoff if this reduces the payoff of his opponent by
(1+αi)/αi Dollars. For example, if  αi = 4, then  player i is willing to give up one Dollar if this
reduces the payoff of his opponent by 1.25 Dollars. We will see that observable behavior in
bargaining and public good games suggests that there are at least some individuals with such
high α’s.
If there are n > 2 players, player i compares his income to all other n-1 players. In this
case the disutility from inequality has been normalized by dividing the second and third term by
n-1. This normalization is necessary to make sure that the relative impact of inequality aversion
on player i’s total payoff is independent of the number of players. Furthermore, we assume for
simplicity that the disutility from inequality is self-centered in the sense that player i compares
himself to each of the other players, but he does not care per se about inequalities within the
group of his opponents.
III. FAIRNESS, RETALIATION AND COMPETITION - ULTIMATUM
AND MARKET GAMES
In this section we apply our model to a well known simple bargaining game - the
ultimatum game - and to simple market games in which one side of the market competes for an
indivisible good. As we will see below a considerable body of experimental evidence indicates
that in the ultimatum game the gains from trade are shared relatively equally while in market
games very unequal distributions are frequently observed. Hence, any alternative to the standard
self-interest model faces the challenge to explain both "fair" outcomes in the ultimatum game
and "competitive" and rather "unfair" outcomes in market games.
A. The Ultimatum game
In an ultimatum game a proposer and a responder bargain about the distribution of a
surplus of fixed size. Without loss of generality we normalize the bargaining surplus to one. The
7responder’s share is denoted by s and the proposer’s share by 1-s. The bargaining rules stipulate
that the proposer offers a share s∈[0,1] to the responder. The responder can accept or reject s. In
case of acceptance the proposer receives a (normalized) monetary payoff
x1 = 1-s while the responder receives x2 = s. In case of a rejection both players receive a
monetary return of zero. The self-interest model predicts that the responder accepts any s∈(0,1]
and is indifferent between accepting and rejecting s = 0. Therefore, there is a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium in which the proposer offers s = 0, which is accepted by the responder.8
By now there are numerous experimental studies from different countries, with different
stake sizes and different experimental procedures, that clearly refute this prediction [for
overviews see Thaler 1988, Güth and Tietz 1990, Camerer and Thaler 1995, Roth 1995]. The
following regularities can be considered as robust facts (see Table I): (i) There are virtually no
offers above 0.5. (ii) The vast majority of offers in almost any study is in the interval [0.4, 0.5].
(iii) There are almost no offers below 0.2. (iv) Low offers are frequently rejected and the
probability of rejection tends to decrease with s. Regularities (i) to (iv) continue to hold for rather
high stake sizes, as indicated by the results of Cameron [1995], Hoffman, McCabe and Smith
[1996] and Slonim and Roth [1997]. The 200,000 Rupia in the second experiment of Cameron
(see Table I) are, e. g., equivalent to three months’ income for the Indonesian subjects. Overall,
roughly 60 - 80 percent of the offers in Table I fall in the interval [0.4, 0.5] while only 3 percent
are below a share of 0.2.
Insert Table I here
To what extent is our model capable of accounting for the stylized facts of the ultimatum
game? To answer this question suppose that the proposer’s preferences are represented by (α1,
β1) while the responder’s preferences are characterized by (α2, β2). The following proposition
characterizes the equilibrium outcome as a function of these parameters.
PROPOSITION 1. It is a dominant strategy for the responder to accept any offer s ≥ 0.5, to reject s if
s < s’(α2) ≡ α2/(1+2α2) < 0.5,
and to accept s > s’(α2). If the proposer  knows the preferences of the responder, he will
offer
                                                          
8 Given that the proposer can choose s continuously, any offer s>0 cannot be an equilibrium offer since there always
exists an s’ with 0 < s’ < s which is also accepted by the responder and yields a strictly higher payoff to the
proposer. Furthermore, it cannot be an equilibrium that the proposer offers s=0 which is rejected by the responder
with positive probability. In this case the proposer would do better by slightly raising his price in which case the
responder would accept with probability 1. Hence, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is that the proposer offers
s=0 which is accepted by the responder.  If there is a smallest money unit ε , then there exists a second subgame
perfect equilibrium in which the responder accepts any s∈[ε,1] and rejects s = 0 while the proposer offers ε.
8 (3)
 
s *
= 0.5 if  β1 > 0.5
∈ [s'(α 2), 0.5] if  β1 = 0.5
= s' (α 2) if  β1 < 0.5
 
 
 
 
 
in equilibrium. If the proposer does not know the preferences of the responder but
believes that α2 is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F(α2),
where F(α2) has support [α,α ]  with 0 ≤ α < α < ∞ , then the probability (from the
perspective of the proposer) that an offer s < 0.5 is going to be accepted is given by
(4) p =
1
F(s/(1 − 2s))∈(0,1)
0
 
 
 
  
   
if  s ≥ s' (α )
if  s' (α) <  s <  s' (α ))
if  s ≤  s' (α )
Hence, the optimal offer of the proposer is given by
 (5) s *
= 0.5
∈[s' (α ),0.5]
∈(s' (α),  s' (α )]
 
 
 
  
         
if  β1 > 0.5
 if  β1 = 0.5 
if  β1 < 0.5
.
Proof: If s ≥ 0.5 the utility of a responder from accepting s is U2(s) = s - β2(2s-1), which
is always positive for β2 < 1 and thus better than a rejection which yields a payoff of 0. The point
is that the responder can achieve equality only by destroying the entire surplus which is very
costly to him if s ≥ 0.5, i.e., if the inequality is to his advantage. For s < 0.5 a responder accepts
the offer only if the utility from acceptance, U2(s) = s - α2(1-2s), is nonnegative which is the case
only if s exceeds the acceptance threshold
s’(α2) ≡ α2/(1+2α2) < 0.5
At stage 1 a proposer never offers s > 0.5. This would reduce his monetary payoff as compared
to an offer of s=0.5, which would also be accepted with certainty and which would yield perfect
equality. If β1 > 0.5 his utility is strictly increasing in s for all s ≤ 0.5. This is the case where the
proposer prefers to share his resources rather than to maximize his own monetary payoff, so he
will offer s=0.5. If  5.01 =β  he is just indifferent between giving one Dollar to the responder and
keeping it to himself, i.e., he is indifferent between all offers s∈[s’(α2), 0.5], If β1 < 0.5 the
proposer would like to increase his monetary payoff at the expense of the responder. However,
he is constrained by the responder’s acceptance threshold.  If the proposer is perfectly informed
about the responder’s preferences, he will simply offer s’(α2). If the proposer is imperfectly
informed about the responder’s type, then the probability of acceptance is F(s/(1-2s)) which is
equal to one if s ≥ α (1+2α ) and equal to zero if s ≤ α /(1+2α ). Hence, in this case there exists
9an optimal offer s∈ (s’(α ), s’(α )].
Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 accounts for many of the above mentioned facts. It shows that there are no
offers above 0.5, that offers of 0.5 are always accepted, and that very low offers are very likely to
be rejected. Furthermore, the probability of acceptance, F(s/(1-2s)),  is increasing in s for s <
s’(α ) < 0.5.  Note also that the acceptance threshold s’(α2) = α2/(1+2α2) is nonlinear and has
some intuitively appealing properties. It is increasing and strictly concave in α2 and it converges
to 0.5 if α2 → ∞. Furthermore, relatively small values of α2 already yield relatively large
thresholds. For example, α2 = 1/3 implies s’(α2) = 0.2 and α2 = 0.75 implies s’(α2) = 0.3.
In Section V we go beyond the predictions implied by Proposition 1. There we ask
whether there is a distribution of preferences that can explain not just the major facts of the
ultimatum game but also the facts in market and cooperation games which will be discussed in
the next sections.
B. Market Game with Proposer Competition
It is a well established experimental fact that in a broad class of market games prices
converge to the competitive equilibrium. [Smith 1982, Davis and Holt 1993]. For our purposes,
the interesting fact is that convergence to the competitive equilibrium can be observed even if
that equilibrium is very "unfair" by virtually any conceivable definition of fairness, i.e., if all of
the gains from trade are reaped by one side of the market. This empirical feature of competition
can be demonstrated in a simple market game in which many price setting sellers (proposers)
want to sell one unit of a good to a single buyer (responder) who demands only one unit of the
good.9
Such a game has been implemented in four different countries by Roth, Prasnikar,
Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir [1991]: Suppose that there are n - 1 proposers who simultaneously
propose a share si ∈ [0,1], i ∈{1, ..., n-1}, to the responder. The responder has the opportunity to
accept or reject the highest offer   s  = maxi {si}. If there are several proposers who offered s  one
of them is randomly selected with equal probability. If the responder rejects   s  no trade takes
place and all players receive a monetary payoff of zero. If the responder accepts   s  her monetary
payoff is   s  and the successful proposer earns 1 - s  while unsuccessful proposers earn zero. If
                                                          
9We deliberately restrict our attention to simple market games for two reasons: (i) The potential impact of inequity
aversion can be seen most clearly in such simple games. (ii) They allow for an explicit game-theoretic analysis. In
particular, it is easy to establish the identity between the competitive equilibrium and the subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome in these games. Notice that some experimental market games, like e.g. the continuous double
auction as developed by Smith [1962], have such complicated strategy spaces  that no complete game-theoretic
analysis is yet available. For attempts in this direction see Friedman and Rust [1993].
10
players are only concerned about their monetary payoffs this market game has a straightforward
solution: The responder accepts any s  > 0. Hence, for any si ≤ s  < 1 there exists an ε > 0 such
that proposer i can strictly increase his monetary payoff by offering  s +ε < 1. Therefore, any
equilibrium candidate must have   s  = 1. Furthermore, in equilibrium a proposer i who offered si
= 1 must not have an incentive to lower his offer. Thus, there must be at least one other player j
who proposes sj = 1, too. Hence, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in
which at least two proposers make an offer of one, and the responder reaps all gains from trade.10
Roth et al. have implemented a market game in which nine players simultaneously
proposed si while one player accepted or rejected s . Experimental sessions in four different
countries have been conducted. The empirical results provide ample evidence in favor of the
above prediction. After approximately five to six periods the subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome was reached in each experiment in each of the four countries. To what extent can our
model explain this observation?
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that the utility functions of the players are given by (1). For any
parameters (αi,βi), i ∈{1, ..., n}, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
in which at least two proposers offer s = 1 which is accepted by the responder.
The formal proof of the proposition is relegated to the Appendix, but the intuition is quite
straightforward. Note first that, for similar reasons as in the ultimatum game, the responder must
accept any   s ≥ 0.5. Suppose that he rejects a "low" offer s  < 0.5. This cannot happen on the
equilibrium path either since in this case proposer i can improve his payoff by offering  si = 0.5
which is accepted with probability 1 and gives him a strictly higher payoff. Hence, on the
equilibrium path   s  must be accepted.  Consider now any equilibrium candidate with  s  < 1. If
there is one player i offering si <   s , then this player should have offered slightly more than  s .
There will be inequality anyway, but by winning the competition player i can increase his own
monetary payoff and he can turn the inequality to his advantage. A similar argument applies if all
players offer si =   s  < 1 . By slightly increasing his offer player i can increase the probability of
winning the competition from 1/(n-1) to 1. Again, this increases his expected monetary payoff
and it turns the inequality towards the other proposers to his advantage. Therefore,   s  < 1 cannot
be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence, the only equilibrium candidate is that at least
two sellers offer   s   = 1. This is a subgame perfect equilibrium since all sellers receive a payoff
of 0 and no player can change this outcome by changing his action. The formal proof in the
Appendix extends this argument to the possibility of mixed strategies. This extension also shows
that the competitive outcome must be the unique equilibrium outcome in the game with
incomplete information where proposers do not know each others utility functions.
                                                          
10 Note that there are many subgame perfect equilibria in this game. As long as two sellers propose s = 1 any offer
distribution of the remaining sellers is compatible with equilibrium.
11
Proposition 2 provides an explanation for why markets in all four countries in which Roth
et.al. (1991) conducted this experiment quickly converged to the competitive outcome even
though the results of the ultimatum game, that have also been done in these countries, are
consistent with the view that the distribution of preferences differs across countries.11
C. Market Game with Responder Competition
In this section we apply our model of inequity aversion to a market game for which it is
probably too early to speak of well established stylized facts since only one study with a
relatively small number of independent observations [Güth, Marchand, Rulliere 1997] has been
conducted so far. The game concerns a situation in which there is one proposer but many
responders competing against each other. The rules of the game are as follows. The proposer,
who is denoted as player 1, proposes a share s∈[0,1] to the responders. There are 2,...,n
responders who observe s and decide simultaneously whether to accept or reject s. Then a
random draw selects with equal probability one of the accepting responders. In case that all
responders reject s all players receive a monetary payoff of zero. In case of acceptance of at least
one responder the proposer receives 1-s and the randomly selected responder gets paid s. All
other responders receive zero.  Note that in this game there is competition in the second stage of
the game whereas in Section III.B. we have competing players in the first stage.
The prediction of the standard model with purely selfish preferences for this game is
again straightforward. Responders accept any positive s and are indifferent between accepting
and rejecting s=0. Therefore, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in which
the proposer offers s=0 which is accepted by at least one responder.12 The results of Güth et al.
show that the standard model captures the regularities of this game rather well. The acceptance
thresholds of responders quickly converged to very low levels.13 Although the game was
repeated only five times, in the final period the average acceptance threshold is well below 5
percent of the available surplus with 71 percent of the responders stipulating a threshold of
exactly zero and 9 percent a threshold of s’ = 0.02. Likewise, in period five the average offer
declined to 15 percent of the available gains from trade. In view of the fact that proposers had not
been informed about responders’ previous acceptance thresholds such low offers are remarkable.
In the final period all offers were below 25 percent while in the ultimatum game such low offers
are very rare. 14 To what extent is this apparent willingness to make and to accept extremely low
                                                          
11 Rejection rates in Slovenia and the USA were significantly higher than rejection rates in Japan and Israel.
12 In the presence of a smallest money unit ε there exists an additional, slightly different equilibrium outcome: The
proposer offers s = ε which is accepted by all the responders. To support this equilibrium all responders have to
reject s = 0. We assume, however, that there is no smallest money unit.
13 The gains from trade were 50 French Francs. Before observing the offer s each responder stated an acceptance
threshold. If s was above the threshold the responder accepted the offer, if it was below she rejected s.
14 Due to the gap between acceptance thresholds and offers we conjecture that the game had not yet reached a stable
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offers compatible with the existence of inequity averse subjects? As the following proposition
shows our model can account for the above regularities.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose β1 < (n-1)/n. Then there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which
all responders accept any s ≥ 0 and the proposer offers s=0. The highest offer s that can
be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium is given by
(8) s = i∈ 2,...,n{ }min iα
(1− iβ )(n −1) + 2 iα + iβ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 <  
1
2
.
Proof: See Appendix.
The first part of Proposition 3 shows that responder competition always ensures the
existence of an equilibrium in which all the gains from trade are reaped by the proposer
irrespective of the prevailing amount of inequity aversion among the responders. This result is
not affected if there is incomplete information about the types of players and is based on the
following intuition. Given that there is at least one other responder j who is going to accept an
offer of 0, there is no way how responder i can affect the outcome and he may just as well accept
this offer, too. Note, however, that the proposer will offer s=0 only if β1 < (n-1)/n. If there are n
players altogether, than giving away one Dollar to one of the responders reduces inequality by 1
+ [1/(n-1)] = n/(n-1) Dollars. Thus, if the nonpecuniary gain from this reduction in inequality,
β1[n/(n-1)], exceeds the cost of 1, player 1 prefers to give away money to one of the responders.
Recall that in the bilateral ultimatum game the proposer offered an equal split if β1 > 0.5. An
interesting aspect of our model is that an increase in the number of responders renders s = 0.5
less likely because it increases the threshold β1 has to pass.
The second part of Proposition 3 shows, however, that there may also be other equilibria.
Clearly, a positive share s can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium only if all
responders can credibly threaten to reject any s' < s. When is it optimal to carry out this threat?
Suppose that s < 0.5 has been offered and that this offer is being rejected by all other responders
j ≠ i. In this case responder i can enforce an egalitarian outcome by rejecting the offer as well.
Rejecting reduces not only the inequality towards the other responders but also the
disadvantageous inequality towards the proposer. Therefore, responder i is willing to reject this
offer if nobody else accepts it and if the offer is sufficiently small, i.e., if the disadvantageous
inequality towards the proposer is sufficiently large. More formally, given that all other
                                                                                                                                                                                          
outcome after five periods. The strong and steady downwards trend in all previous periods also indicates that a
steady state had not yet been reached. Recall that the market game of Roth et al. [1991] was played for ten periods.
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responders reject, responder i prefers to reject as well if and only if the utility of acceptance
obeys
 (9) s − α i
n −1
(1− 2s) − n − 2
n −1
βi s ≤ 0.
This is equivalent to
(10) s  ≤ si
' ≡
α i
1 − βi( ) n −1( )+ 2αi + βi
.
Thus, an offer s >0 can be sustained if and only if (10) holds for all responders. It is
interesting to note that the highest sustainable offer does not depend on all the parameters αi and
βi but only on the inequity aversion of the responder with the lowest acceptance threshold si’. In
particular, if there is only one responder with αi =0, Proposition 3 implies that there is a unique
equilibrium outcome with s=0. Furthermore, the acceptance threshold is decreasing with n. Thus,
the model makes the intuitively appealing prediction that for n → ∞  the highest sustainable
equilibrium offer converges to zero whatever the prevailing amount of inequity aversion.15
D. Competition and Fairness
Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that there is a more general principle at work that is
responsible for the very limited role of fairness considerations in the competitive environments
considered above. Both propositions show that the introduction of inequity aversion hardly
affects the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in market games with proposer and responder
competition relative to the prediction of the standard self-interest model. In particular,
Proposition 2 shows that competition between proposers renders the distribution of preferences
completely irrelevant. It does not matter for the outcome whether there are many or only a few
subjects who exhibit strong inequity aversion. By the same token it also does not matter whether
the players know or do not know the preference parameters of the other players. The crucial
observation in this game is that no single player can enforce an equitable outcome. Given that
there will be inequality anyway, each proposer has a strong incentive to outbid his competitors in
order to turn part of the inequality to his advantage and to increase his own monetary payoff. A
similar force is at work in the market game with responder competition. As long as there is at
least one responder who accepts everything no other responder can prevent an inequitable
outcome. Therefore, even very inequity averse responders try to turn part of the unavoidable
                                                          
15 Note that the acceptance threshold is affected by the reference group. If, for example, each responder compares his
payoff only to the proposer but not to the other responders, than the acceptance threshold increases for each
responder and a higher offer may be sustained in equilibrium.
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inequality into inequality to their advantage by accepting low offers. It is, thus, the impossibility
of preventing inequitable outcomes by individual players that renders inequity aversion
unimportant in equilibrium.
The role of this factor can be further highlighted by the following slight modification of
the market game with proposer competition: Suppose that at stage two the responder may accept
any of the offers made by the proposers; he is not forced to take the highest offer. Furthermore,
there is an additional stage three at which the proposer who has been chosen by the responder at
stage two can decide whether he wants to stick to his offer or whether he wants to withdraw in
which case all the gains from trade are lost for all parties. This game would be an interesting test
for our theory of inequity aversion. Clearly, in the standard model with selfish preferences these
modifications do not make any difference for the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. Also, if
some players have altruistic preferences in the sense that they appreciate any increase in the
monetary payoff of other players the result remains unchanged because altruistic players do not
withdraw the offer at stage three. With inequity aversion the outcome will be radically different,
however. A proposer who is inequity averse may want to destroy the entire surplus at stage three
in order to enforce an egalitarian outcome, in particular if he has a high αi and if the split
between himself and the responder is uneven. On the other hand, an even split will be withdrawn
by proposer i at stage three only if βi >(n-1)/(n-2). Thus, the responder may prefer to accept an
offer si =0.5 rather than an offer sj > 0.5 because the "better" offer has a higher chance of being
withdrawn. This in turn reduces competition between proposers at stage one. Thus, while
competition nullifies the impact of inequity aversion in the ordinary proposer competition game,
inequity aversion greatly diminishes the role of competition in the modified proposer
competition game. This change in the role of competition is caused by the fact that in the
modified game a single proposer can enforce an equitable outcome.
We conclude that competition renders fairness considerations irrelevant if and only if
none of the competing players can punish the monopolist by destroying some of the surplus and
enforcing a more equitable outcome. This suggests that fairness plays a smaller role in most
markets for goods16 than in labor markets. This follows from the fact that, in addition to the
rejection of low wage offers, workers have some discretion over their work effort. By varying
their effort they can exert a direct impact on the relative material payoff of the employer.
Consumers, in contrast, have no similar option available. Therefore, a firm may be reluctant to
offer a low wage to workers who are competing for a job if the employed worker has the
opportunity to respond to a low wage with low effort. As a consequence, fairness considerations
                                                          
16 There are some markets for goods where fairness concerns play a role. For example, World Series or NBA playoff
tickets are often sold far below the market clearing price even though there is a great deal of competition amongst
buyers. This may be explained by long-term profit maximizing considerations of the monopolist, who interacts
repeatedly with groups of customers who care for fair ticket prices. On this see also Kahnemann, Knetsch and Thaler
[1986].
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may well give rise to wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment.17
                                                          
17 Experimental evidence for this is provided by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl [1993] and Fehr and Falk
[forthcoming]. We deal with these games in more detail in Section VI.
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IV. COOPERATION AND RETALIATION - COOPERATION GAMES
In the previous section we have shown that our model can account for the relatively "fair"
outcomes in the bilateral ultimatum game as well as for the rather "unfair" or "competitive"
outcomes in games with proposer or responder competition. In this section we investigate the
conditions under which cooperation can flourish in the presence of inequity aversion. We show
that inequity aversion improves the prospects for voluntary cooperation relative to the predictions
of the standard model. In particular, we show that there is an interesting class of conditions under
which the selfish model predicts complete defection while in our model there exist equilibria in
which everybody cooperates fully. But, there are also other cases where the predictions of our
model coincide with the predictions of the standard model.
We start with the following public good game. There are n ≥ 2 players who decide
simultaneously on their contribution levels gi∈[0,y], i∈{1,...,n}, to the public good. Each player
has an endowment of y. The monetary payoff of player i is given by
(11) xi(g1,...,gn) = y - gi + a jg
j =1
n
∑ ,   1/n < a < 1,
where a denotes the constant marginal return to the public good G ≡ jg
j =1
n
∑ . Since a < 1, a
marginal investment into G causes a monetary loss of (1-a), i.e., the dominant strategy of a
completely selfish player is to choose gi = 0. Thus, the standard model predicts gi = 0 for all
i∈{1,...,n}. However, since a > 1/n, the aggregate monetary payoff is maximized if each player
chooses gi = y.
Consider now a slightly different public good game that consists of two stages. At stage 1
the game is identical to the previous game. At stage 2 each player i is informed about the
contribution vector (g1,...,gn) and can simultaneously impose a punishment on the other players,
i.e., player i chooses a punishment vector pi = (pi1,...,pin) where pij ≥ 0 denotes the punishment
player i imposes on player j. The cost of this punishment to player i is given by c ijp
j =1
n
∑ , 0<c<1.
Player i may, however, also be punished by the other players which generates an income loss to i
of jip
j =1
n
∑ . Thus, the monetary payoff of player i is given by
 (12) xi(g1,...gn, p1,...,pn) = y - gi + a jg
j =1
n
∑  - jip
j =1
n
∑  - c ijp
j =1
n
∑ ,
What does the standard model  predict for the two-stage game? Since punishments are
costly players’ dominant strategy at stage two is to not punish. Therefore, if selfishness and
rationality are common knowledge, each player knows that the second stage is completely
irrelevant. As a consequence, players have exactly the same incentives at stage 1 as they have in
the one-stage game without punishments, i.e., each player’s optimal strategy is still given by gi =
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0. To what extent are these predictions of the standard model consistent with the data from
public good experiments. For the one-stage-game there are, fortunately, a large number of
experimental studies (see Table II). They investigate the contribution behavior of subjects under
a wide variety of conditions. In Table II we concentrate on the behavior of subjects in the final
period only since we want to exclude the possibility of repeated games effects. Furthermore, in
the final period we have more confidence that the players fully understand the game that is being
played.18
The striking fact revealed by Table II is that in the final period of n-person cooperation
games (n > 3) without punishment the vast majority of subjects plays the equilibrium strategy of
complete free-riding. If we average over all studies 73 percent of all subjects choose gi = 0 in the
final period. It is also worth mentioning that in addition to those subjects who play exactly the
equilibrium strategy there is very often a nonnegligible fraction of subjects who play "close" to
the equilibrium. In view of the facts presented in Table II it seems fair to say that the standard
model "approximates" the choices of a big majority of subjects rather well. However, if we turn
to the public good game with punishment there emerges a radically different picture although the
standard model predicts the same outcome as in the one-stage game. Figure 2 shows the
distribution of contributions in the final period of the two-stage game conducted by Fehr and
Gächter [1996]. Note that the same subjects generated the distribution in the game without and in
the game with punishment. Whereas in the game without punishment most subjects play close to
complete defection a strikingly large fraction of roughly 80 percent cooperates fully in the game
with punishment.19 Fehr and Gächter report that the vast majority of punishments is imposed by
cooperators on the defectors and that lower contribution levels are associated with higher
received punishments. Thus, defectors do not gain from free-riding because they are being
punished.
Insert Table II here
Insert Figure 2 here
The behavior in the game with punishment represents an unambiguous rejection of the
standard model. This raises the question whether our model is capable of explaining both the
                                                          
18 This point is discussed in more detail in Section V. Note that in some of the studies summarized in Table II the
group composition was the same for all T periods (partner condition). In others the group composition randomly
changed from period to period (stranger condition). However, in the last period subjects in the partner condition play
also a true one-shot public goods game. Therefore, Table II presents the behavior from stranger as well as from
partner experiments.
19 Subjects in the Fehr and Gächter study participated in both conditions, i.e. in the game with punishment and in the
game without punishment. The parameter values for a and n in this experiment are a=0.4 and n=4. It is interesting to
note that contributions are significantly higher in the two-stage game already in period one. Moreover, in the one-
stage game cooperation strongly decreases over time whereas in the two-stage game cooperation quickly converges
to the high levels observed in period ten.
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evidence of the one-stage public good game and of the public good game with punishment.
Consider the one-stage public good game first. The prediction of our model is summarized in the
following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4.
(a) If a+βi < 1 for player i, then it is a dominant strategy for that player to choose gi= 0.
(b) Let k denote the number of players with a+βi < 1, 0 ≤ k ≤ n.  If k/(n-1) > a/2, then there is
a unique equilibrium with gi = 0 for all i∈{1, ..., n}.
 (c) If k/(n-1) < (a+βj-1)/(αj+βj) for all players j∈{1, ..., n} with a+βj > 1, then there do exist
other equilibria with positive contribution levels. In these equilibria all k players with a+βi
< 1 must choose gi=0 while all other players contribute gj = g∈ [0,y]. Note further that
(a+βj-1)/(αj+βj) < a/2.
The formal proof of Proposition 4 is relegated to the Appendix. To see the basic intuition
for the above results consider a player with a+βi < 1. By spending one Dollar on the public good
he earns a Dollars in monetary terms. In addition he may get a non-pecuniary benefit of at most
βi Dollars from reducing inequality. Therefore, since a+βi<1 for this player, it is a dominant
strategy for him to contribute nothing. Part (b) of the proposition says that if the fraction of
subjects, for whom gi=0 is a dominant strategy, is sufficiently high, there is a unique equilibrium
in which nobody contributes. The reason is that if there are only a few players with a+βi >1, they
would suffer too much from the disadvantageous inequality caused by the free-riders. The proof
of the proposition shows that if a potential contributor knows that the number of free riders, k, is
larger than a(n-1)/2, then he will not contribute either. The last part of the proposition shows that
if there are sufficiently many players with a+βi >1, they can sustain cooperation among
themselves even if the other players do not contribute. This requires, however, that the
contributors are not too upset about the disadvantageous inequality towards the free riders. Note
that the condition k/(n-1) < (a+βj-1)/(αj+βj) is less likely to be met as αj goes up. To put it
differently: The greater the aversion against being the sucker the more difficult it is to sustain
cooperation in the one-stage game. We will see below that the opposite holds true in the two-
stage game.
Note that in almost all experiments considered in Table II a≤1/2. Thus, if the fraction of
players with a+βi < 1 is larger than 1/4, then there is no equilibrium with positive contribution
levels. This is consistent with the very low contribution levels that have been observed in these
experiments. Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that the prospects for cooperation are weakly
increasing with the marginal return a.
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Consider now the public good game with punishment. To what extent is our model
capable of accounting for the very high cooperation in the public good game with punishment. In
the context of our model the crucial point is that free-riding generates a material payoff
advantage relative to those who cooperate. Since c < 1,  cooperators can reduce this payoff
disadvantage by punishing the free-riders. Therefore, if those who cooperate are sufficiently
upset by the inequality to their disadvantage, i.e., if they have sufficiently high α‘s , then they are
willing to punish the defectors even though this is costly to themselves. Thus, the threat to punish
free-riders may be credible, which may induce potential defectors  to contribute at the first stage
of the game. This is made precise in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose that there is a group of n’ "conditionally cooperative enforcers", 1 ≤ n’
≤  n, with preferences that obey a+βi ≥  1 and
(13) c < iα
(n −1)(1 + iα ) -  (n' -1)( iα + iβ )
 for all i∈{1,...,n’} ,
whereas all other players do not care about inequality, i.e. αi = βi = 0 for i∈{n’+1,...,n}.
Then the following strategies, that describe the players’ behavior on and off the
equilibrium path, form a subgame perfect equilibrium:
• In the first stage each player contributes gi = g ∈ [0,y]
• If each player does so there are no punishments in the second stage. If one of the
players i∈ {n’+1,...,n} deviates and chooses gi < g, then each enforcer j∈{1, ...,
n’} chooses pji = (g – gi)/(n’ - c) while all other players do not punish. If one of
the "conditionally cooperative enforcers" chooses gi < g, or if any player chooses
gi > g, or if more than one player deviated from g, then one Nash-equilibrium of
the punishment game is being played.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that full cooperation, as observed in the experiments by Fehr and
Gächter [1996], can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome if there is a group of n’
"conditionally cooperative enforcers". In fact, one such enforcer may be enough (n’=1) if his
preferences satisfy c < αi/(n-1)(1+αi) and a+βi ≥ 1, i.e., if there is one person who is sufficiently
concerned about inequality.  To see how the equilibrium works consider such a "conditionally
cooperative enforcer". For him a+βi ≥ 1, so he is happy to cooperate if all others cooperate as
well (this is why he is called "conditionally cooperative"). In addition, condition (13) makes sure
that he cares sufficiently about inequality to his disadvantage. Thus he can credibly threaten to
punish a defector (this is why he is called "enforcer"). Note that condition (13) is less demanding
if n’ or αi increases. The punishment is constructed such that the defector gets the same monetary
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payoff as the enforcers. Since this is less than what a defector would have received if he had
chosen gi = g, a deviation is not profitable.
If the conditions of Proposition 5 are met, then there exists a continuum of equilibrium
outcomes. This continuum includes the "good equilibrium" with maximum contributions but also
the "bad equilibrium" where nobody contributes to the public good. In our view there is,
however, a reasonable refinement argument that rules out "bad" equilibria with low
contributions. To see this note that the equilibrium with the highest possible contribution level,
gi=g=y for all i∈{1,...,n}, is the unique symmetric and efficient outcome. Since it is symmetric it
yields the same payoff for all players. Hence, this equilibrium is a natural focal point which
serves as a coordination device even if the subjects choose their strategies independently.
Comparing Propositions 4 and 5, it is easy to see that the prospects for cooperation are
greatly improved if there is an opportunity to punish defectors. Without punishments all players
with a+βi < 1 will never contribute. Players with a+βi > 1 may contribute only if they care
enough about inequality to their advantage but not too much about disadvantageous inequality.
On the other hand, with punishments all players will contribute if there is a (small) group of
"conditionally cooperative enforcers". The more these enforcers care about disadvantageous
inequality the more they are prepared to punish defectors which makes it easier to sustain
cooperation. In fact, one person with a sufficiently high αi is already enough to enforce efficient
contributions by all other players.
Before we turn to the next section we would like to point out an implication of our model
for the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Note that the simultaneous PD is just a special case of the
public good game without punishment for n = 2 and gi∈{0,y}, i = 1,2. Therefore, Proposition 4
applies, i. e., cooperation is an equilibrium if both players meet the condition a+βi > 1. Yet, if
only one player meets this condition defection of both players is the unique equilibrium. In
contrast, in a sequentially played PD a purely selfish first mover has an incentive to contribute if
he faces a second mover who meets a+βi > 1. This is so because the second mover will respond
cooperatively to a cooperative first move while he defects if the first mover defects. Thus, due to
the reciprocal behavior of inequity averse second movers cooperation rates among first movers in
sequentially played PD’s are predicted to be higher than cooperation rates in simultaneous PD’s.
There is fairly strong evidence in favor of this prediction. Watabe et al. [1996] and Hayashi et el.
[1998] show that cooperation rates among first movers in sequential PD’s are indeed much
higher and that reciprocal cooperation of second movers is very frequent.
V. PREDICTIONS ACROSS GAMES
In this section we examine whether the distribution of parameters that is consistent with
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experimental observations in the ultimatum game is consistent with the experimental evidence
from the other games. It is not our aim here to show that our theory is consistent with 100 percent
of the individual choices. The objective is rather to offer a first test for whether there is a chance
that our theory is consistent with the quantitative evidence from different games. Admittedly,
this test is rather crude. However, at the end of this section we make a number of predictions that
are implied by our model and we suggest how these predictions can be tested rigorously with
some new experiments.
In many of the experiments referred to in this section the subjects had to play several
times the same game either with the same or with varying opponents. Whenever available, we
take the data of the final period as the facts to be explained. There are two reasons for this
choice. First, it is well known in experimental economics that in interactive situations one cannot
expect the subjects to play an equilibrium in the first period already. Yet, if subjects have the
opportunity to repeat their choices and to better understand the strategic interaction, then very
often rather stable behavioral patterns, that may differ substantially from first-period-play,
emerge. Second, if there is repeated interaction between the same opponents then there may be
repeated games effects that come into play. These effects can be excluded if we look at the last
period only.
Table III suggests a simple discrete distribution of αi and βi. We have chosen this
distribution because it is consistent with the large experimental evidence we have on the
ultimatum game [see Table I above and Roth 1995]. Recall from Proposition 1 that for any given
αi, there exists an acceptance threshold s’(αi) = αi /(1+2αi) such that player i accepts s if and
only if s ≥  s’(αi). In all experiments there is a fraction of subjects that rejects offers even if they
are very close to an equal split. Thus, we (conservatively) assume that 10 percent of the subjects
have α=4 which implies an acceptance threshold of s’=4/9=0.444. Another, typically much larger
fraction of the population insists on getting at least one third of the surplus, which implies a
value of α which is equal to one. These are at least 30 percent of the population. Note that they
are prepared to give up one Dollar if this reduces the payoff of their opponent by two Dollars.
Another, say, 30 percent of the subjects insists on getting at least one quarter, which implies
α=0.5. Finally, the remaining 30 percent of the subjects do not care very much about inequality
and are happy to accept any positive offer (α=0).
Insert Table III here
If a proposer does not know the parameter α of his opponent but believes that the
probability distribution over α is given by Table III, then it is straightforward to compute his
optimal offer as a function of his inequality parameter β. The optimal offer is given by
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 (14) s* (β ) =
0.5 if βi > 0.5
0.4 if 0.235 < βi < 0.5
0.3 if βi < 0.235
 
 
 
 
 
Note that it is never optimal to offer less than one third of the surplus, even if the
proposer is completely selfish. If we look at the actual offers made in the ultimatum game, there
are roughly 40 percent of the subjects who suggest an equal split. Another 30 percent offer
s∈[0.4,0.5), while 30 percent offer less than 0.4. There are hardly any offers below 0.25. This
gives us the distribution of β in the population described in Table III.
Let us now see whether this distribution of preferences is consistent with the observed
behavior in other games. Clearly, we have no problem to explain the evidence on market games
with proposer competition. Any distribution of α and β  yields the competitive outcome which is
observed by Roth et al. [1991] in all their experiments. Similarly, in the market game with
responder competition, we know from Proposition 3 that if there is at least one responder who
does not care about disadvantageous inequality (i.e., αi = 0), then there is a unique equilibrium
outcome with s = 0. With five responders in the experiments by Güth, Marchand and Rulliere
[1997] and with the distribution of types from Table III, the probability that there is at least one
such player in each group is given by 1-0.75 = 83 percent. This is roughly consistent with the fact
that 71 percent of the players accepted an offer of zero, and nine percent had an acceptance
threshold of s’ = 0.02 in the final period.
Consider now the public good game. We know by Proposition 4 that cooperation can be
sustained as an equilibrium outcome only if the number k of players with a+βi < 1 obeys
 k/(n-1) < a/2. Thus, our theory predicts that there is less cooperation the smaller a which is
consistent with the empirical evidence of Isaac and Walker [1988] presented in Table II.20 In a
typical treatment a=0.5 and n=4. Therefore, if all players believe that there is at least one player
with a+βi < 1, then there is a unique equilibrium with gi=0 for all players. Given the distribution
of preferences of Table III, the probability that there are four players with β>0.5 is equal to 0.44
=2.56 percent. Hence, we should observe that, on average, almost all individuals fully defect. A
similar result holds for most other experiments in Table II. Except for the Isaac and Walker
experiments with n = 10 a single player with a+βi < 1 is sufficient for the violation of the
necessary condition for cooperation, k/(n-1) < a/2. Thus in all these experiments our theory
predicts that randomly chosen groups are almost never capable of sustaining cooperation. Table 2
indicates that this is not quite the case although 73 percent of individuals choose indeed gi=0.
Thus, it seems fair to say that our model is consistent with the bulk of individual choices in this
game.21
                                                          
20 For a = 0.3 the rate of defection is substantially larger than for a = 0.75. The Issac and Walker experiments were
explicitely designed to test for the effects of variations in a.
21 When judging the accuracy of the model one should also take into account that there is in general a significant
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Finally, the most interesting experiment from the perspective of our theory is the public
good game with punishment. While in the game without punishment most subjects play close to
complete defection, a strikingly large fraction of roughly 80 percent cooperates fully in the game
with punishment. To what extent can our model explain this phenomenon? We know from
Proposition 5 that cooperation can be sustained if there is a group of n’ "conditionally
cooperative enforcers" with preferences that satisfy (13) and a+βi ≥ 1. For example, if all four
players believe that there is at least one player with αi≥ 1.5 and βi≥ 0.6, there is an equilibrium in
which all four players contribute the maximum amount. As discussed in Section V, this
equilibrium is a natural focal point. Since the computations of the probability that the conditions
of Proposition 5 are met is a bit more cumbersome we have put them into the appendix. It turns
out that for the preference distribution given in Table III the probability that a randomly drawn
group of four players meets the conditions is 61.1 percent. Thus our model is roughly consistent
with the experimental evidence of Fehr and Gächter.22
Clearly, the above computations provide only rough evidence in favor of our model. To
rigorously test the model, additional experiments have to be run. We would like to suggest a few
variants of the experiments discussed so far that would be particularly interesting:23
♦ Our model predicts that under proposer competition two proposers are sufficient for s = 1 to
be the unique equilibrium outcome irrespective of the players’ preferences. Thus, one could
conduct the proposer competition game with two proposers that have proven to be very
inequity averse in other games. This would constitute a particularly tough test of our model.
♦ Most public good games that have been conducted had symmetric payoffs. Our theory
suggests that it will be more difficult to sustain cooperation if the game is asymmetric. For
example, if the public good is more valuable to some of the players there will in general be a
conflict between efficiency and equality. Our prediction is that if the game is sufficiently
asymmetric it is impossible to sustain cooperation even if a is very large or if players can use
punishments.
♦ It would be interesting to repeat the public good experiment with punishments for different
values of a, c and n. Proposition 5 suggest that we should observe less cooperation if a goes
down and if c goes up. The effect of an increase in the group size n is ambiguous, however.
For any given player it becomes more difficult to satisfy condition (13) as n goes up. On the
                                                                                                                                                                                          
fraction of the subjects that plays close to complete free-riding in the final round. A combination of our model with
the view that human choice is characterised  by a fundamental randomness [McKelvey and Palfrey 1995] may
explain much of the remaining 25 percent of individual choices. This task is, however, left for future research.
22 In this context one has to take into account that the total number of available individual observations in the game
with punishment is much smaller than for the game without punishment or for the ultimatum game. Future
experiments will have to show whether the Fehr-Gächter results are the rule in the punishment game or whether they
exhibit unusually high cooperation rates.
23 We are grateful to a referee who suggested some of these tests.
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other hand, the larger the group the higher is the probability that there is at least one person
with a very high α. Our conjecture is that a moderate change in the size of the group does not
affect the amount of cooperation.
♦ One of the most interesting tests of our theory would be to do several different experiments
with the same group of subjects. Our model predicts a cross-situation correlation in behavior.
For example, the observations from one experiment could be used to estimate the parameters
of the utility function of each individual. It would then be possible to test whether this
individual’s behavior in other games is consistent with his estimated utility function.
♦ In a similar fashion, one could screen subjects according to their behavior in one experiment
before doing a public good experiment with punishments. If we group the subjects in this
second experiment according to their observed inequality aversion, the prediction is that those
groups with high inequality aversion will contribute while those with low inequality aversion
will not.
VI. DICTATOR AND GIFT EXCHANGE GAMES
The preceding sections have shown that our very simple model of linear inequality
aversion is consistent with the most important facts in ultimatum, market and cooperation games.
One problem of our approach is, however, that it yields too extreme predictions in some other
games, such as the "dictator game". The dictator game is a two person game in which only player
1, the "dictator", has to make a decision. Player 1 has to decide what share s ∈ [0,1] of a given
amount of money to pass on to player 2. For a given share s monetary payoffs are given by x1 = 1
- s and x2 = s, respectively. Obviously, the standard model predicts s = 0. In contrast, in the
experimental study of Forsythe et al. [1994] only about 20 percent of subjects chose s = 0, 60
percent chose 0 < s < 0.5, and again roughly 20 percent chose s = 0.5. In the study of Andreoni
and Miller [1995] the distribution of shares is again bimodal but puts more weight on the
"extremes": Approximately 40 percent of the subjects gave s = 0, 20 percent gave 0 < s < 0.5,
and roughly 40 percent gave s = 0.5. Shares above s = 0.5 were practically never observed.
Our model predicts that player 1 offers s = 0.5 if  β1 > 0.5 and s = 0 if  β1 < 0.5. Thus we
should observe only very "fair" or very "unfair" outcomes, a prediction that is clearly refuted by
the data. However, there is a straightforward solution to this problem. We assumed that the
inequity aversion is piecewise linear. The linearity assumption was imposed in order to keep our
model as simple as possible. If we allow for a utility function that is concave in the amount of
advantageous inequality, there is no problem to generate optimal offers that are in the interior of
[0,0.5].
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It is important to note that non-linear inequity aversion does not affect the qualitative
results in the other games we considered. This is straightforward in market games with proposer
or responder competition. Recall that in the context of proposer competition there exists a unique
equilibrium outcome in which the responder receives the whole gains from trade irrespective of
the prevailing amount of inequity aversion. Thus, it also does not matter whether linear or
nonlinear inequity aversion prevails. Likewise, under responder competition there is a unique
equilibrium outcome in which the proposer receives the whole surplus if there is at least one
responder who does not care about disadvantageous inequality. Obviously, this proposition holds
irrespective of whether the inequity aversion of the other responders is linear or not. Similar
arguments hold for public good games with and without punishment. Concerning the public good
game with punishment, for example, the existence of nonlinear inequity aversion obviously does
not invalidate the existence of an equilibrium with full cooperation. It only renders the condition
for the existence of such an equilibrium, i.e., condition (13), slightly more complicated.
Another interesting game is the so-called trust- or gift exchange game [Fehr, Kirchsteiger
and Riedl 1993; Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997]. The
common feature of trust- or gift exchange games is that they resemble a sequentially played PD
with more than two actions for each player. In some experiments the gift exchange game has
been embedded in a competitive experimental market. For example, a slightly simplified version
of the experiment conducted by Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger [1997] has the following
structure. There is one experimental firm, which we denote as player 1, and which can make a
wage offer w to the experimental workers. There are 2, ..., n workers who can simultaneously
accept or reject w. Then a random draw selects with equal probability one of the accepting
workers. Thereafter, the selected worker has to choose effort e  from the interval [ _e , 
_e ], 0 < _e  <
_e . In case that all workers reject w all players receive nothing. In case of acceptance the firm
receives xf = ve  - w where v denotes the marginal product of effort. The worker receives xw = w -
c(e ) where c(e ) denotes the effort costs and obeys c( _e ) = c’( _e ) = 0 and c’ > 0, c’’ > 0 for e  >
_e . Moreover, v > c’(
_e ) so that e  = 
_e  is the efficient effort level. This game is essentially a
market game with responder competition in which an accepting responder has to make an effort
choice after he is selected.
If all players are pure money maximizers the prediction for this game is straightforward.
Since the selected worker always chooses the minimum effort _e  the game collapses into a
responder competition game with gains from trade equal to v _e . In equilibrium the firm earns v _e
and w = 0. Yet, since v > c’(
_e ) there exist many (w, e )-combinations that would make both the
firm and the selected worker better off. In sharp contrast to this prediction, and also in sharp
contrast to what is observed under responder competition without effort choices, firms offer
substantial wages to the workers and wages do not decrease over time. Moreover, workers
provide effort above _e  and there is a strong positive correlation between w and e .
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To what extent can our model explain this outcome? Put differently, why is it the case
that under responder competition without effort choice the responders’ income converges
towards the selfish solution, whereas under responder competition with effort choice, wages
substantially above the selfish solution can be maintained. From the viewpoint of our model the
key fact is that – by varying the effort choice – the randomly selected worker has the opportunity
to affect the difference xf  - xw. If the firm offers “low” wages such that xf  > xw holds at any
feasible effort level the selected worker will always choose the minimum effort. However, if the
firm offers a “high” wage such that at _e  the inequality xw  > xf holds, inequity averse workers
with a sufficiently high βi are willing to raise e  above _e . Moreover, in the presence of nonlinear
inequity aversion higher wages will be associated with higher effort levels. The reason is that by
raising the effort workers can move in the direction of more equitable outcomes. Thus, our model
is capable of explaining the apparent wage rigidity observed in gift exchange games. Since the
presence of inequity averse workers generates a positive correlation between wages and effort the
firm does not gain by exploiting the competition among the workers. Instead, it has an incentive
to pay efficiency wages above the competitive level.
VII. EXTENSIONS AND POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
So far we ruled out the existence of subjects who like to be better off than others. This is
unsatisfactory because subjects with βi  < 0 clearly exist. Fortunately, however, such subjects
have virtually no impact on equilibrium behavior in the games considered in this paper. To see
this, suppose that a fraction of subjects with βi  = 0 exhibits βi  < 0 instead. This obviously does
not change responders’ behavior in the ultimatum game because for them only αi matters. It also
does not change the proposer behavior in the complete information case because both proposers
with βi  = 0 and those with βi  < 0 will make an offer that exactly matches the responder’s
acceptance threshold.24 In the market game with proposer competition proposers with βi  < 0 are
even more willing to overbid a going share below s = 1, compared to subjects with βi  = 0,
because by overbidding they gain a payoff advantage relative to the other proposers. Thus,
Proposition 2 remains unchanged. Similar arguments apply to the case of responder competition
(without effort choices) because a responder with βi  < 0 is even more willing to underbid a
positive share compared to a responder with βi  = 0. In the public good game without punishment
all players with a+βi < 1 have a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. It does not matter
whether these players exhibit a positive or a negative βi . Finally, the existence of types with βi  <
0 also leaves Proposition 5 unchanged.25 If there are sufficiently many conditionally cooperative
                                                          
24 It may affect  proposer behavior in the incomplete information case although the effect of a change in βi is
ambiguous. This ambiguity stems from the fact that the proposer’s marginal expected utility of s may rise or fall if βi
falls.
25 This holds true if, for those with a negative βi, the abolute value of βi is not too large. Otherwise defectors would
have an incentive to punish the cooperators. A defector who imposes a punishment of one on a cooperator gains
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enforcers it does not matter whether the remaining players have βi  < 0 or not. Recall that -
according to Proposition 5 - strategies that discipline potential defectors make the enforcers and
the defectors equally well off in material terms. Hence, a defector cannot gain a payoff advantage
but is even worse off relative to a cooperating nonenforcer. These punishment strategies,
therefore, are sufficient to discipline potential defectors irrespective of their βi -values.
Another set of questions concerns the choice of the reference group. As argued in Section
II, for many laboratory experiments our assumption that subjects compare themselves to all other
subjects in the (usually relatively small) group is a natural starting point. However, we are aware
of the possibility that this may not always be an appropriate assumption.26 There may well be
interactive structures in which some agents have a salient position which makes them natural
reference agents. Moreover, the social context and the institutional environment in which
interactions take place is likely to be important.27 Bewley [1998], for example, reports that in
non-unionized firms workers compare themselves exclusively with their firm and with other
workers in their firm. This suggests that only within-firm social comparisons but not across-firm
comparisons affect the wage setting process. This is likely to be different in unionized sectors
because unions make across-firm and even across sector comparisons. Babcock, Wang, and
Loewenstein [1996], for example, provide evidence that wage bargaining between teachers’
unions and school boards is strongly affected by reference wages in other school districts.
An obvious limitation of our model is that it cannot explain the evolution of play over
time in the experiments discussed. Instead, our examination aims at the explanation of the stable
behavioral patterns that emerge in these experiments after several periods. It is clear, that a
model that solely focuses on equilibrium behavior cannot explain the time path of play. This
limitation of our model also precludes a rigorous analysis of the short-run impact of equity
considerations.28 The empirical evidence suggests that equity considerations also have important
short run effects. This is obvious in ultimatum games, public good games with punishment and
gift exchange games where equity consideration lead to substantial deviations from the selfish
solution in the short and in the long run. However, they also seem to play a short run role in
                                                                                                                                                                                          
[-βi /(n-1)](1-c) > 0 in nonpecuniary terms and has materaial costs of c. Thus, he is willing to punish if
|βi| ≥ [c/(1-c)](n-1) holds. This means that only defectors with implausibly high absolute values of βi are willing to
punish. For example, for c = 0.5 and n = 4, |βi| ≥ 3 is required. For c = 0.2 and n = 4, |βi| still has to exceed 0.75.
26 Bolton and Ockenfels [1997] develop a model similar to ours that differs in the choice of the reference payoff. In
their model subjects compare themselves only to the average payoff of the group.
 27 A related issue is the impact of social context on a person’s degree of inequity aversion. It seems likely that a
person has a different degree of inequity aversion when interacting with a friend in personal matters than in a
business transaction with a stranger. In fact evidence for this is provided by Loewenstein, Thompson and Bazerman
[1989]. Note, however, that in all experiments considered above interaction took place among anonymous strangers
in a neutrally framed context.
28 In the short-run minor changes in the (experimental) context can affect behavior. For example, there is evidence
that subjects contribute more in a one-shot PD if it is called „community game“ than if it is called „wall street game“.
Under the plausible assumption that the community frame triggers more optimistic beliefs about other subjects
inequity aversion our model is consistent with this observation.
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market games with proposer or responder competition or public good games without
punishment, that is, in games in which the selfish solution prevails in the long run. In these
games the short-run deviation from equilibrium is typically in the direction of more equitable
outcomes.29
                                                          
29 Such short-run effects also are suggested by the results of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986] and Franciosi et
al. [1995]. Franciosi et al. show that - in a competitve experimental market (without effort choices) - equity
considerations significantly retard the adjustment to the (selfish) equilibrium. Ultimately, however, they do not
prevent full adjustment to the equilibrium. Note that the retardation effect suggests that temporary demand shocks (e.
g., after a natural disaster) may have no impact on prices at all because the shock vanishes before competitive forces
can overcome the fairness induced resistance to price changes.
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VIII. RELATED APPROACHES IN THE LITERATURE
There are several alternative approaches that try to account for persistent deviations from
the predictions of the self-interest model by assuming a different motivational structure. The
approach pioneered by Rabin [1993] emphasizes the role of intentions as a source of reciprocal
behavior. Rabin’s approach has recently been extended in interesting ways by Falk and
Fischbacher [1998] and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [1998]. Andreoni and Miller [1995] is
based on the assumption of altruistic motives. Another interesting approach is Levine [1997]
who assumes that people are either spiteful or altruistic to various degrees. Finally, there is the
approach by Bolton and Ockenfels [1997] that is, like our model, based on a kind of inequity
aversion.
The theory of reciprocity as developed by Rabin rests on the idea that people are willing
to reward fair intentions and to punish unfair intentions. As our approach Rabin’s model is also
based on the notion of equity: Player j perceives player i’s intention as unfair if player i chooses
an action that gives j less than the equitable material payoff. The advantage of his model is that
this disutility can be explicitly interpreted as arising from j’s judgement about i’s unfair
intention. As a consequence, player j’s response to i’s action can be explicitly interpreted as
arising from j’s desire to punish an unfair intention while our model does not explicitly suggest
this interpretation of j’s response. On the other hand, disadvantages of Rabin’s model are that it
is restricted to two-person normal form games and that it gives counterintuitive predictions if it is
applied to the normal form of sequential move games. 30
The lack of explicit modeling of intentions in our model does, however, not imply that
the model is incompatible with an intentions-based interpretation of reciprocal behavior. In our
model reciprocal behavior is driven by the preference parameters αi. and βi. The model is silent
as to why αi and βi are positive. Whether these parameters are positive because individuals care
directly for inequality or whether they infer intentions from actions that cause unequal outcomes
is not modeled. Yet, this means that positive αi’s and βi’s can be interpreted as a direct concern
for equality as well as a reduced form concern for intentions. An intentions-based interpretation
of our preference parameters is possible because bad or good intentions behind an action are, in
general, inferred from the equity implications of the action. Therefore, people who have a desire
to punish a bad intention behave as if they dislike being worse off relative to an equitable
reference point and people who reward good intentions behave as if they dislike being better off
                                                          
30 In the sequentially played Prisoner’s Dilemma Rabin’s model predicts that unconditional cooperation by the
second mover is part of an equilibrium, i.e., the second mover cooperates even if the first mover defects. Moreover,
conditional cooperation by the second mover is not part of an equilibrium. The data in Watabe et al. [1996] and
Hayashi et al. [1998] show, however, that unconditional cooperation is virtually non-existent while conditional
cooperation is the rule. Likewise, in the gift exchange game workers behave conditionally cooperative while
unconditional cooperation is non-existent. The reciprocity approaches of Falk and Fischbacher [1998] and of
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [1998] do not share this disadvantage of Rabin’s model.
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relative to an equitable reference point. As a consequence, our preference parameters are
compatible with the interpretation of intentions-driven reciprocity.
To illustrate this point further consider, e.g., an ultimatum game that is played under two
different conditions [Blount 1995]:
• In the "random" condition the first mover's offer is determined by a random device. The
responder knows how the offer is generated and that the proposer cannot be held responsible
for it.
• In the "intention" condition the proposer makes the offer himself and the responder knows
that this is the proposer's deliberate choice.
In the intention condition the responder may not only be directly concerned about
inequity. He may also react to the fairness of the perceived intentions of the proposer. In contrast,
in the random condition it is only the concern for pure equity that may affect the responder’s
behavior. In fact, Blount reports that there are responders who reject positive but unequal offers
in both conditions. However, the acceptance threshold is significantly higher in the intention
condition.31 Recall from Proposition 1 that there is a monotonic relationship between the
acceptance threshold and the parameter αi. Thus, this result suggests that the preference
parameters do not remain constant across random and intention condition. Yet, for all games
played in the intention condition and, hence, for all games considered in the previous sections,
the preference parameters should be constant across games.
Altruism is consistent with voluntary giving in dictator and public good games. It is,
however, inconsistent with the rejection of offers in the ultimatum game and it cannot explain the
huge behavioral differences between public good games with and without punishment. It also
seems difficult to reconcile the extreme outcomes in market games with altruism. Levine’s
approach can explain extreme outcomes in market games as well as the evidence in the centipede
game but it cannot explain positive giving in the dictator game. It also seems that Levine’s
approach has difficulties in explaining that the same subjects behave very non-cooperatively in
the public good game without punishment while they behave very cooperatively in the game with
punishment.
The approach by Bolton and Ockenfels (BO) is similar to our model although there are
some differences in the details. For example, in their model people compare their material payoff
to the material average payoff of the group. In our view the appropriate choice of the reference
                                                          
31 Similar evidence is given by Charness [forthcoming] for a gift exchange game. For further evidence in favor of
intentions-driven reciprocity see Bolle and Kritikos [1998]. Surprisingly, and in contrast to these studies, Bolton,
Brandts and Katok [1997] and Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels [1997] find no evidence for intentions-driven
reciprocity.
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payoff is ultimately an empirical question that cannot be solved on the basis of the presently
available evidence. There may well be situations in which the average payoff is the appropriate
choice. However, in the context of the public good game with punishment it seems to be
inappropriate because it cannot explain why cooperators want to punish a defector. If there are,
say, n-1 fully cooperating subjects and one fully defecting subject, the payoff of each cooperator
is below the group’s average payoff. Cooperators can reduce this difference between own payoff
and the group’s average payoff by punishing one of the other players, i.e., they are indifferent
between punishing other cooperators and the defector.
Bolton and Ockenfels assume that the marginal disutility of small deviations from
equality is zero. Therefore, if subjects are non-satiated in their own material payoff they will
never propose an equal split in the dictator game. Likewise, they will - in case of non-satiation in
material payoffs - never propose an equal split in the ultimatum game unless α2 = ∞  for
sufficiently many responders. Typically, the modal offer in most ultimatum game experiments is,
however, the equal split. In addition, the assumption implies that complete free-riding is the
unique equilibrium in the public good game without punishment for all a < 1 and all n ≥ 2. Their
approach thus rules out equilibria where only a fraction of all subjects cooperates.32
IX. SUMMARY
There are situations in which the standard self-interest model is unambiguously refuted.
However, in other situations the predictions of this model seem to be very accurate. For example,
in simple experiments like the ultimatum game, the public good game with punishments or the
gift exchange game the vast majority of the subjects behaves in a "fair" and "cooperative"
manner although the self-interest model predicts very "unfair" and "noncooperative" behavior.
Yet, there are also experiments like, e.g., market games or public good games without
punishment, in which the vast majority of the subjects behaves in a rather "unfair" and
"noncooperative" way - as predicted by the self-interest model. We show that this puzzling
evidence can be explained in a coherent framework if - in addition to purely selfish people - there
is a fraction of the population that cares for equitable outcomes. Our theory is motivated by the
psychological evidence on social comparison and loss aversion. It is very simple and can be
applied to any game. The predictions of our model are consistent with the empirical evidence on
all of the above mentioned games. Our theory also has strong empirical implications for many
other games. Therefore, it is an important task for future research to test the theory more
rigorously against competing hypothesis. In addition, we believe that future research should aim
                                                          
32 Persistent asymmetric contributions are observed in Isaac and Walker [1994]
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at formalizing the role of intentions explicitly for the n-person case.
A main insight of our analysis is that there is an important interaction between the
distribution of preferences in a given population and the strategic environment. We have shown
that there are environments in which the behavior of a minority of purely selfish people forces
the majority of fair-minded people to behave in a completely selfish manner, too. For example, in
a market game with proposer or responder competition it is very difficult, if not impossible, for
fair players to achieve a "fair" outcome. Likewise, in a simultaneous public good game with
punishment even a small minority of selfish players can trigger the unraveling of cooperation.
Yet, we have also shown that a minority of fair-minded players can force a big majority of selfish
players to cooperate fully in the public good game with punishment. Similarly, our examination
of the gift exchange game indicates that fairness considerations may give rise to stable wage
rigidity despite the presence of strong competition among the workers. Thus, competition may or
may not nullify the impact of equity considerations. If, despite the presence of competition,
single individuals have opportunities to affect the relative material payoffs, equity considerations
will affect market outcomes even in very competitive environments. In our view these results
suggest that the interaction between the distribution of preferences and the economic
environment deserves more attention in future research.
1APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2: We first show that it is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium if at least
two proposers offer s=1 which is accepted by the responder. Note first that the responder will
accept any offer ,5.0≥s  because
(A1) ( ) 00
1
2)1(
1
1
≥−
−
−
−+−
−
− s
n
nss
n
s ii ββ
To see this, note that (A1) is equivalent to
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Since β i ≤ 1,  this inequality clearly holds if
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which must be the case since s ≤1. Hence, the buyer will accept s=1. Given that there is at least
one other proposer who offers s=1 and given that this offer will be accepted, each proposer gets a
monetary payoff of 0 anyway and no proposer can affect this outcome. Hence, it is indeed
optimal for at least one other proposer to offer s=1, too.
Next, we show that this is the unique equilibrium outcome. Suppose that there is an other
equilibrium in which 1<s  with positive probability. This is only possible if each proposer offers
si<1 with positive probability. Let si be the lowest offer of proposer i that has positive
probability. It cannot be the case that player i puts strictly positive probability on offers si∈[si, sj)
because the probability that he wins with such an offer is zero. To see this note that in this case
player i would get
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On the other hand, if proposer i chooses si∈(maxj≠i{sj, 0.5},1), then there is a positive probability
that he will win in which case he gets
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Of course, there may also be a positive probability that proposer i does not win, but in this case
he gets again -αi /(n-1). Thus, proposer i would deviate. It follows that it must be the case that
si=s for all i.
Suppose that proposer i changes his strategy and offers s+ε < 1 in all states when his
strategy would have required him to choose s. The cost of this change is that whenever proposer i
2would have won with the offer s he now receives only 1-s -ε. However, by making ε arbitrarily
small, this cost becomes arbitrarily small. The benefit is that there are now some states of the
world which have strictly positive probability in which proposer i does win with the offer s+ε but
in which he would not have won with the offer s. This benefit is strictly positive and does not go
to zero as ε becomes small. Hence, s<1 cannot be part of an equilibrium outcome. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We first show that s=1, which is accepted by all responders,  is indeed a
subgame perfect equilibrium. Note that any offer s ≥ 0 5. will be accepted by all responders. The
argument is exactly the same as the one in the beginning of the proof of Proposition 1. The
following Lemma will be useful:
Lemma 1  For any s < 0.5 there exists a continuation equilibrium in which everybody accepts s.
Given that all other players accept s player i prefers to accept as well if and only if
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which is equivalent to
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Since we assume 1<iβ , this inequality must hold.!
Consider now the proposer. Clearly, it is never optimal to offer s > 0.5. Such an offer is
always dominated by s = 0.5 which yields a higher monetary payoff and less inequality. On the
other hand, we know by Lemma 1 that for any s ≤ 0 5.  there exists a continuation equilibrium in
which this offer is accepted by everybody. Thus, we only have to look for the optimal s from the
point of view of the proposer given that s will be accepted. His payoff function is
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3Hence, if this condition holds, it is an equilibrium that the proposer offers s = 0 which is accepted
by all responders. We now show that the highest offer that can be sustained in a subgame perfect
equilibrium is given by (8).
Lemma 2: Suppose that s < 0.5 has been offered. There exists a continuation equilibrium in
which this offer is rejected by all responders if and only if
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Given that all other responders reject s, responder i will reject s as well if and only if
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which is equivalent to (A11). Thus, (A11) is a sufficient condition for a continuation equilibrium
in  which s is rejected by everybody.
Suppose now that (A11) is violated  for at least one  { }i n∈ 2,... , .  We want to show that in
this case there is no continuation equilibrium in which s is rejected by everybody. Note first, that
in this case  responder i prefers to accept s if all other responders reject it. Suppose now that at
least one other responder accepts s. In this case responder i prefers to accept s as well if and only if
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The right hand side of this inequality is smaller than 0. We know already that the left hand side is
greater than 0 since (A11) is violated. Therefore, responder i prefers to accept s as well. We
conclude that if (A11) does not hold for at least one i, then at least one responder will accept s.
Hence, (A11) is also necessary.!
If β 1
1
<
−n
n
, an equilibrium offer must be sustained by the threat that any smaller offer ~s  will be
rejected by everybody. But we know from Lemma 2 that an offer ~s  may be rejected only if (A11)
holds for all i. Thus, the highest offer s that can be sustained in equilibrium is given by (8). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
(a) Suppose that 1-a > βi for player i. Consider an arbitrary contribution vector (g1,...,gi-1,
gi+1,...,gn) of  the other players. Without loss of generality we relabel the players such that i=1
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4and 0 ≤ g2 ≤ g3 ≤ ... ≤ gn . If player 1 chooses g1=0, his payoff is given by
(A14)
Note first, that if all other players choose gj=0, too, then g1=0 is clearly optimal. Furthermore,
player 1 will never choose g1 > max {gj}. Suppose that there is at least one player who chooses
gj>0. If player 1 chooses g1>0, g1 ∈[gk, gk+1] , k∈{2, ... , n}, then his payoff is given by
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Hence, gi=0, is indeed a dominant strategy for player i.
(b) It clearly is an equilibrium if all players contribute nothing because to unilaterally contribute
more than zero reduces the monetary payoff and causes disadvantageous inequality. Suppose that
there exists another equilibrium with positive contribution levels. Relabel players such that
0 ≤ g1 ≤ g2 ≤ ... ≤ gn. By part (a) we know that all k players with 1-a>βi  must choose gi=0.
Therefore 0 = g1 =  ... = gk. Consider player l > k who has the smallest positive contribution
level, i.e., 0 = gl-1 < gl ≤  gl+1 ≤  ... ≤ gn. Player l's utility is given by
(A15)
where Ul(0) is the utility player l gets if he deviates and chooses gl=0. Since αl ≥ βl, l ≥ k+1, and
βl < 1, we have
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Thus, if
(A17)
player l prefers to deviate from the equilibrium candidate and to choose gl=0. But this inequality
is equivalent to
(A18)
which is the condition given in the proposition.
(c) Suppose that the conditions of the Proposition are satisfied. We want to construct an
equilibrium in which all k players with 1-a > βi contribute nothing, while all other n-k players
contribute g∈[0,y]. We only have to check that contributing g is indeed optimal for the
contributing players. Consider some player j with 1-a < βj. If he contributes g his payoff is given
by:
(A19)
It clearly does not pay to contribute more than g. So suppose player j reduces his contribution
level by Δ>0. Then his payoff is
.
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Thus, if this condition holds for all (n-k) players j with 1-a < βj , then this is indeed an
equilibrium. It remains to be shown that (a+βj-1)/(αj+βj) ≤ a/2. Note that αj ≥βj implies
(a+βj-1)/(αj+βj) ≤  (a+βj-1)/(2βj). Furthermore
which proves our claim.  Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that one of the players  i∈ {n’+1,...,n} chooses gi < g. If all
players stick to the punishment strategies in stage 2, then deviator i gets the same monetary
payoff as each enforcer j ∈ {1,...,n’}.  In this case monetary payoffs of i and j are given by
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Thus, given the punishment strategy of the enforcers, deviators cannot get a higher payoff
than the enforcers. However, they get a strictly lower payoff than the non-enforcers who did not
deviate. We now have to check that the punishment strategies are credible, i.e. that an enforcer
cannot gain from reducing his pij. If an enforcer reduces pij by ε he saves cε  and experiences less
disadvantageous inequality relative to those (n - n’ - 1) players who chose g but do not punish.
This creates a non-pecuniary utility gain of [αi(n - n’ - 1)cε]/(n - 1). On the other hand, the
enforcer also has non-pecuniary costs because he experiences now disadvantageous inequality
relative to the defector and a distributional advantage relative to the other (n’ - 1) enforcers who
punish fully. The latter generates a utility loss of βi(n’ - 1)cε/(n - 1) whereas the former reduces
utility by αi(1 - c)ε/(n - 1). Thus the loss from a reduction in pij is greater than the gain if
 (A23)
1
n − 1( )
 [αi(1 - c)ε + βi(n’ - 1)cε]  >  cε + αi(n - n’ - 1)
cε
n − 1( )
holds. Some simple algebraic manipulations show that condition (A23) is equivalent to condition
(13). Hence, the punishment is credible.
Consider now the incentives of one of the enforcers to deviate in the first stage. Suppose he
reduces his contribution by ε>0. Ignoring possible punishments in the second stage for a
moment, player i gains (1-a)ε in monetary terms but incurs a non-pecuniary loss of βiε by
creating inequality to all other players. Since 1-a < βi by assumption this deviation does not play.
If his defection triggers punishments in the second stage, then this reduces his monetary payoff
which cannot make him better off than he would have been if he had chosen gi = g. Hence, the
enforcers are not going to deviate at stage 1 either. It is easy to see that choosing gi > g can not be
profitable for any player either, since it reduces the monetary payoff and increases inequality.
Q.E.D.
Computation of the probability that there are conditionally cooperative enforcers:
To compute the probability that, in a randomly drawn group of four, there are subjects who obey
condition (13) and a+βi ≥ 1, we have to make an assumption about the correlation between αi
and βi We mentioned already that the empirical evidence suggests that these parameters are
8positively correlated. For concreteness we assume that the correlation is perfect. Thus, in terms
of Table III, all players with α=1 or α=4 are assumed to have β=0.6.  This is clearly not fully
realistic, but it simplifies the analysis dramatically.
In the Fehr-Gächter experiment the relevant parameters are a=0.4, n=4, and (roughly33) c=0.2.
The following summary states the conditions on αi and βi implied by Proposition 5 for a group of
n’∈{1, ..., 4} conditionally cooperative enforcers. If one of these conditions holds, cooperation
can be sustained in equilibrium:
(i) n’=1, αi ≥ 1.5 and βi ≥ 0.6.
(ii) n’=2, αi ≥ 1 - 0. 3βi and βi ≥ 0.6.
(iii) n’=3, αi ≥ 0.75 - 0.5βi and βi ≥ 0.6.
(iv) n’=4, αi ≥ 0.6 - 0.6βi and βi ≥ 0.6.
Note that for each group n’ of conditionally cooperative enforcers the conditions on αi and βi
have to hold simultaneously. Given the discrete distribution of α and β of Table III this can only
be the case if
• there is at least one player with αi = 4 and βi = 0.6, or
• there are at least two players with αi = 1 and βi = 0.6, or
• both.
Given the numbers of Table III it is not difficult to show that the probability that one of these
cases applies is equal to 61.12 percent.
                                                          
33 The cost function in Fehr-Gächter is actually convex, so that we have to slightly simplify their model. Yet, the
vast majority of actual punishments occurred where c = 0.2.
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1TABLE I
PERCENTAGE OF OFFERS BELOW 0.2 AND BETWEEN 0.4 AND 0.5 IN THE ULTIMATUM GAME
Study
(Payment method)
Number of
observations
Stake Size
(Country)
Percentage of
offers with
s < 0.2
Percentage of
offers with
0.4 ≤ s ≤ 0.5
Cameron [1995]
(all Ss paid) 35
Rp 40.000
(Indonesia) 0 66
Cameron [1995]
(all Ss paid) 37
Rp 200.000
(Indonesia) 5 57
FHSS [1994]
(all Ss paid) 67
$5 and $10
(USA) 0 82
Güth et al. [1982]
(all Ss paid) 79
DM 4 - 10
(Germany) 8 61
Hoffman, McCabe
and Smith [1996]
(all Ss paid)
24
$10
(USA) 0 83
Hoffman, McCabe
and Smith [1996]
(all Ss paid)
27
$ 100
(USA) 4 74
Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler [1986)
(20 % of Ss paid)
115
$10
(USA) ? 75a
Roth et al. [1991]
(random payment
method)
116b
approx. $10
(USA, Slovenia,
Israel, Japan)
3 70
Slonim & Roth
[1997]
(random payment
method)
240c
SK 60
(Slovakia) 0.4d 75
Slonim & Roth
[1997]
(random payment
method)
250c
SK 1500
(Slovakia) 8d 69
Aggregate result of
all studiese
875 3.8 71
a: percentage of equal splits, b: only observations of the final period, c: observations of all 10 periods, d:
percentage of offers below 0.25, e: without Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler [1986].
2TABLE II
PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS WHO FREE-RIDE COMPLETELY IN THE FINAL PERIOD OF
A REPEATED PUBLIC GOOD GAME
Study Country Group Size (n) Marginal
pecuniary
return  (a)
Total number
of subjects
Percentage of
free-riders
(gi = 0)
Isaac and Walker
[1988]
USA 4 and 10 0.3 42 83
Isaac and Walker
[1988]
USA 4 and 10 0.75 42 57
Andreoni [1988] USA 5 0.5 70 54
Andreoni [1995a] USA 5 0.5 80 55
Andreoni [1995b] USA 5 0.5 80 66
Croson [1995] USA 4 0.5 48 71
Croson [1996] USA 4 0.5 96 65
Keser and van
Winden [1996]
Holland 4 0.5 160 84
Ockenfels and
Weimann [1996]
Germany 5 0.33 200 89
Burlando and Hey
[1997]
UK, Italy 6 0.33 120 66
Falkinger, Fehr,
Gächter &
Winter-Ebmer
[forthcoming]
Switzerland 8 0.2 72 75
Falkinger, Fehr,
Gächter &
Winter-Ebmer
[forthcoming]
Switzerland 16 0.1 32 84
Total number of subjects in all experiments and percentage of
complete free-riding
1042 73
3TABLE III
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTION OF PREFERENCES
DISTRIBUTION OF α‘S AND
ASSOCIATED ACCEPTANCE
THRESHOLDS OF BUYERS
DISTRIBUTION OF β‘S AND
ASSOCIATED OPTIMAL OFFERS OF
SELLERS
α = 0 30 percent s’(0) = 0 β = 0 30 percent s* = 1/3
α = 0.5 30 percent s’(0.5) =1/4 β = 0.25 30 percent s* = 4/9
α = 1 30 percent s’(1) = 1/3 β = 0.6 40 percent s* = 1/2
α = 4 10 percent s’(4)=4/9
4FIGURE I
Preferences with Inequity Aversion
xi
xi
 xj
Ui(xjxi)
45° line
5FIGURE II
Distribution of Contributions in the final period of public good game with punishment (Source:
Fehr and Gächter 1996)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
with punishment
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
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Contribution in percent of endowment
